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Vital New Study of a Political Giant
Today, as when they worked together in Washington, Abraham Lincoln
towers over his Secretary of State, William Henry Seward. But until May 1860,
Seward cast a longer shadow. Governor of New York when Lincoln toiled in the
Illinois legislature and a prominent U.S. Senator when Lincoln languished in
political obscurity, Seward was the odds-on favorite to win the Republican
party’s presidential nomination in 1860. Then, of course, Lincoln seized the
prize. But Seward adjusted. “The relationship between Lincoln and Seward was
close," Walter Stahr writes, “closer than between the president and any other
cabinet member" (366). They enjoyed each other’s company and they tended to
think alike. A gravely wounded Seward survived the ghastly assassination
conspiracy that killed Lincoln, and so Seward continued to head the cabinet
during Andrew Johnson’s turbulent tenure. This fine new biography goes far
toward restoring Seward’s stature. He was among the giants in the American
pantheon. “Other than presidents," Stahr concludes, “Seward was the foremost
statesman of the nineteenth century" (547).
Writing about Seward is no casual undertaking. One must start with a
daunting bulk of documents he collected over his long career (the microfilmed
segments total almost 200 reels, and other portions remain in the University of
Rochester archives). A friend of Seward’s once wryly observed that his
biographer “would not be at a loss for materials" (542). The written record tends,
however, to be opaque—Seward’s oracular prose sometimes conceals as much
as it reveals. Worse, the man’s handwriting was abominable, as was that of his
alter-ego Thurlow Weed. Any serious Seward biographer faces additional
challenges. He kept no diary, so those who seek inside information about
developments in Lincoln’s cabinet turn first to the diaries and postwar
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recollections of Gideon Welles and Salmon P. Chase, Seward’s rivals and
adversaries. Often seeing Seward as an unprincipled opportunist who tried to
exercise a malign influence over the president, they have exercised an outsized
influence in shaping historical memory.
Many memorable encounters and points of colorful detail relating to Lincoln
and Seward and the Civil War era have become so embedded in popular
consciousness that we simply take them for granted. Not Stahr. He investigates
familiar stories industriously, often with surprising results. Did Lincoln and
Seward spend a night together at the same hotel in Worcester, Massachusetts,
while out campaigning for the Whig ticket in 1848—at which time Lincoln
allegedly allowed that Seward had been right in his “anti-slavery position and
principles" (110-11)? Alas, the train schedules did not match up, Stahr finds, and
so the oft-told tale is probably apocryphal. Did Seward attempt to sabotage the
Fort Sumter expedition in April 1861 when he diverted the Powhatan, a
powerful warship, to Fort Pickens instead? The charges “fall flat," Stahr
concludes (273-74, 277). Navy lieutenant David Dixon Porter had first claim to
the Powhatan for Pickens; he worked secretly through Seward because the Navy
Department was honeycombed with secessionists. Did Seward boast that he
could ring a “little bell," and thereby throw civilians into prison? “In all
likelihood Seward never said this," Stahr decides (285). The story first appeared
in anti-administration newspapers, a dubious source. Did Lincoln first reveal to
Seward and Welles, while they and Seward’s daughter-in-law Anna Seward
were out on a carriage ride on Sunday, July 13, 1862, that he intended to issue an
emancipation proclamation? The carriage ride did happen, Stahr accepts, but
“the famous carriage ride conversation is a later invention by Welles" (340). Was
“Seward’s folly" hooted out of sight before the ink had dried on the treaty by
which Russia ceded Alaska to the United States? No (487).
Stahr has closely studied the pivotal five months between the presidential
election in November 1860 and the first shots of the war in April 1861. (A
personal disclaimer: I exchanged several e-mail communications with Stahr as
he researched this book.) Seward promised that Republicans would respect the
right of the slave states to determine the future of slavery. He counted on white
Southerners themselves to realize, sooner or later, that slavery was obsolete.
Until the very moment the war started, he hoped that sensible leaders North and
South could prevent a violent impasse. Stahr does not fully agree with young
Henry Adams, who lauded Seward’s “wisdom and moderation" in trying to avert
war, and considered it “one of the wonders of statesmanship" (250). But Stahr
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recognizes that Seward held Virginia in the Union in early 1861 and kept open
communications with anti-secession leaders elsewhere in the Upper South. He
would have gone further than Lincoln did to hold their allegiances, even to the
point of withdrawing from Fort Sumter. Had war still come, he would have tried
to entice more of the Upper South to follow the example of Kentucky.
The modern focus on emancipation as the central wartime issue inevitably
marginalizes Seward. For him, Stahr writes, “the war was about the Union, and
not about slavery" (303). His abolitionist wife Frances disagreed, and the issue
added to the strains in their already-distanced marriage. During the early phase
of the war, he opposed any enlargement of Union war aims. But as the war raged
on, he concluded that slavery was doomed. He predicted, in 1863, that
emancipation would reknit the national fabric—Americans would discover once
again that they were “friends and brothers" and they would come to cherish the
Union that bound them together (385). When the war ended, and with it the slave
system, he wanted the southern states to be “allowed to govern themselves" and
invited “to rejoin the national government, without undue delay or onerous
conditions" (529). His eagerness to bring the South back into the Union enabled
him to work with Andrew Johnson, while it estranged him from most of his
fellow Republicans. He opposed radical reconstruction and “was prepared to
wait for gradual social and political processes to improve the lives of former
slaves and their descendants" (463). If judged only by the standards of
enthusiasm for an antislavery war and a zeal for equal rights, Seward appears to
have been a dead weight.
Seward’s formal wartime duties centered on the perilous international
situation. Stahr credits him for persuading Lincoln to back down and allow a
peaceful resolution to the Trent affair, “the Cuban Missile Crisis of the
nineteenth century" (308). Seward could not prevent France from installing a
puppet government in Mexico, but he skillfully isolated it after the war ended
while, at the same time, deflecting hot-blooded Americans (notably Ulysses S.
Grant) who wanted American forces sent into Mexico. Seward’s principal
wartime objective was to keep Britain and France from offering to mediate the
war or aid the Confederacy. An illogical aspect of international realpolitik aided
him: Czarist Russia maintained warm relations with the United States, as he
deftly reminded Britain and France. During Johnson’s presidency, Seward
embarked on an ambitious plan for overseas acquisitions. He persuaded Russia
to sell Alaska and he lay claim to Midway Island but he hoped for more—British
Columbia, Hawaii, the Isthmus of Panama, the Danish West Indies, plus the
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2012

3

Civil War Book Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 26

Dominican Republic, perhaps Haiti too, and eventually Cuba. He anticipated a
leading role for the United States in the Caribbean region, and expanded
commercial ties with Latin America and Asia.
The Seward that emerges on these pages considered himself impelled by
“motives of duty" rather than “motives of ambition" (476). He was an optimistic
nationalist—proud that the United States stretched from ocean to ocean and
thereby demonstrated the success of republican governance, confident that it had
a bright future, and keenly aware that improved transportation and
communications technologies were bringing about a new era of world history.
Stahr also offers glimpses into the inner life of the man with the expansive
national vision—his incompatible marriage; his anxieties about his son William,
fighting in the Army of the Potomac; the delight he took in his daughter Fanny,
and the awful pain inflicted on him by her death; his friendship with the great
Shakespearean actor, Charlotte Cushman, the role model for Fanny of a “useful
unmarried woman" (381); and his late-in-life infatuation with young Olive
Risley.
Frederic Bancroft’s two 1899 volumes, The Life of William H. Seward,
occasionally highlight an important matter that Stahr blurs—for example,
Seward’s desperate effort to depict the Whig party as antislavery in 1848, when
large majorities of voters in western New York were “in favor of Free-Soil
doctrines in the abstract." Those wanting to see the secret messages from the
Upper South that reached Seward in early 1861 also will turn to Bancroft. But in
many other ways Stahr supersedes both Bancroft and Glyndon G. Van Deusen’s
1967 biography, William Henry Seward. Van Deusen’s almost encyclopedic
volume remains useful, but his topical chapters tend to fracture chronology (as
do Bancroft’s), and Van Deusen’s clumsy annotation obscures his sources. Stahr,
by contrast, has written a coherent narrative that keeps Seward in sharp focus.
His full references—the book has over one hundred pages of notes—testify to
his engagement with primary sources and with the modern historiography of the
era. He engages in no special pleading. Every serious student of the Civil War
era will want to own this book, and we may hope that Stahr reaches a wide
audience of interested generalists.
Daniel W. Crofts is working on a history of the would-be Thirteenth
Amendment of 1861. His most recent book is A Secession Crisis Enigma:
William Henry Hurlbert and “The Diary of a Public Man."
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